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ABSTRACT. We give formal content to some concepts, naturally stemming from consistent
history approach (CHA), which are not formalized in the standard formulation of the theory.
The outcoming (extended) conceptual basis is used to perform a formal, conceptually trans-
parent analysis of some debated questions in CHA. As results, the problems raised by contrary
inferences of Kent are ruled out, whereas some prescriptions of the theory cannot be mantained.
RESUME´. Nous fournissons contenu formel a` quelques concepts, sortant naturellement de
la the´orie des histoires consistantes (CHA), qui ne sont pas formalize´s dans la formulation
usuel. La base conceptuelle (extendue) qui en sort est use´e pour effectuer une analyse formel
conceptuelment transparente de quelques proble`mes de´battus dans CHA. Nous avons comme
resultat que le proble`mes souleve´s par les inferences contraires de Kent sont re´solus; toutefois,
des prescriptions de la the´orie ne peuvent pas e´tre maintenues.
Key words: Foundations of quantum theory, Consistent history approach,
contrary inferences
21. Introduction
In recent works [1][2] Bassi and Ghirardi have argued that the consistent
history approach (CHA) to quantum physics, first proposed by Griffiths
[3], leads to logical contradiction with some assumptions “necessary for
a sound interpretation of the theory” [1]. These criticisms to CHA gen-
eralize those moved by Kent [4], who proved that CHA “allows contrary
inferences from the same empirical data”. In his replies Griffiths argues
that the criticisms are the result of a misunderstanding of his theory [5].
However, Griffiths’ arguments did not convince Bassi and Ghirardi [6].
On the other hand, also Kent [7] considered the answer of Griffiths and
Hartle [8] to his own criticism unsatisfactory [4]. Hence, the scientific de-
bate seems to have ended without a definitive clarification of the subject.
We extend the formal apparatus of the theory, by introducing the
notion of support of a family of histories. This theoretical extension allows
us to perform a conceptually transparent analysis of the above mentioned
criticisms. The conclusions of our analysis partly agree with Griffiths; for
instance the conceptual difficulties raised by contrary inferences are ruled
out. But they also entail that some prescriptions of the theory cannot be
mantained, in partial agreement with Bassi and Ghirardi.
In section 3 we present a brief synthesis of the debate. To do this,
3we have to recall, in section 2, some standard concepts of CHA. In sec-
tion 4 we introduce the formal tools we need for the conceptual analysis
performed in sections 5 and 6. In particular, in section 5 we deal with
the criticism of Bassi and Ghirardi; while our analysis shares Griffiths’
conclusion that there is no universal truth functional in quantum his-
tory theory, it entails that we cannot mantain the assumption that every
family of histories can be chosen, in agreement with Bassi and Ghirardi.
In section 6 we show that our analysis of contrary inferences removes
conceptual difficulties, also without the necessity of adopting a weaker
interpretation of perpendicular (i.e. mutually exclusive) events, as done
by Griffiths.
2. Consistent History Quantum Theory
Let H be the Hilbert space of the standard quantum description, in
Heisenberg’s picture, of the physical system. Throughout this paper we
assume that H has a finite dimension N . A decomposition of the identity
is a finite set E = {E(1), E(2), ..., E(k)} of projection operators such that
E(i) ⊥ E(j) if i 6= j and
∑k
i=1E
(i) = 1. Given a finite, ordered sequence
of times (t1, t2, .., tn), for each time tk we consider a decomposition of the
identity Ek whose projections represent (in Heisenberg picture) events
4which may occur at time tk. A sequence h = (E1, E2, ..., En) such that
Ek ∈ Ek, i.e. in Cartesian product E = E1×E2×· · ·×En, is called elemen-
tary history. The family C of histories, generated by E1,E2, ...,En, is the
set of all sequences h = (E1, E2, ..., En) such that Ek =
∑
some iE
(i)
k . Given
every history h, we define the bounded operator Ch = En · En−1 · · ·E1.
Each history h = (E1, E2, ..., En) can be identified with subset h ⊆ E ,
where h = {hˆ = (Eˆ1, Eˆ2, ..., Eˆn) ∈ E | Eˆk ≤ Ek, ∀k}.
The physical interpretation of CHA, which makes it a physical theory,
is based on the principle which establishes that if a given family C satisfies
a criterion of consistency, then
(I) the set of all elementary histories of C is a “sample space of mutually
exclusive elementary events, one and only one of which occurs” [8].
The occurrence of history h means that an elementary history hˆ ∈ h
occurs.
The basic physical notion of the theory is that of occurrence of a history,
whose meaning is the following.
(O) A given history h = (E1, E2, ..., En) occurs if all events E1, E2, ..., En
objectively occur at respective times t1, t2, ..., tn. The occurrence of a
history is an objective physical fact, independent of the performance
of a measurement which reveals this occurrence.
5Hence, in this theory measurements reveal properties already objectively
possessed by the physical system. This is remarkably different from stan-
dard quantum theory, which, on the contrary, can make statistical predic-
tionts only about outcomes of measurements, and cannot describe the oc-
currence of a history h = (E1, E2, ..., En) (consider the case [Ek, Ej] 6= 0).
The criterion for establishing whether C is consistent is given by the fol-
lowing rule of CHA.
RULE 1. A family C is consistent if and only if it is weakly decohering,
i.e., if Re(Tr(Ch1C
∗
h2
)) = 0 for all h1, h2 ∈ E , h1 6= h2.
The occurences of histories are the empirical facts the theory is concerned
with; CHA postulates that their statistics obeys the following rule.
RULE 2. If C is consistent, then number p(h) = 1
N
Tr(ChC
∗
h) is the proba-
bility of occurrence of history h for every h ∈ C.
It can be proved that if C is weakly decohering then, coherently with
statement (I), for every h ∈ C we have p(h) =
∑
hˆ∈h p(hˆ).
Following [9], to make inferences about occurrences of histories, the
initial data, i.e. the available information about the physical system,
must be expressed as sentences involving histories of a consistent family
6C, and assumed as true, i.e. objectively realized sentences. At this point
it is possible to derive conclusions by making logical reasonings in which
histories of C are regarded, according to (I), as events of a classical sam-
ple space. According to CHA these conclusions have to be regarded as
empirically valid sentences. However, another set of conclusions could be
derived by using another consistent family C′ in which the same initial
data can be expressed. A conclusion of this new set could conflict with
the conclusions drawn from C. In Griffiths’ theory these kinds of conflicts
are avoided by means of the introduction of the following.
RULE 3. All valid physical inferences are those obtained by using rule
2 within a single consistent family C. In general, different conclusions
drawn by using distinct consistent families do not hold together.
3. Debated questions
Single family rule 3 is at the root of the criticisms mentioned in section
1. To describe the criticisms we make use of the contrary inferences
discovered by Kent [4].
3.1. Contrary inferences
Kent was able to find two histories h1 = (E0, E1, E2) and h2 = (E0, F1, E2),
7with E1 ⊥ F1, belonging to two different consistent families C1 and C2 re-
spectively, such that according to the rules of CHA
(1)
{
p(E1 | E0, E2) = 1 in family C1
p(F1 | E0, E2) = 1 in family C2
p(E0, E2) 6= 0 (in both families).
If we take as initial data the occurrence of E0 and E2, this becomes a
very striking clear example of the above mentioned conflict. Indeed, these
initial data are compatible with both families C1 and C2 (third equation
in (1)). Therefore, when history h0 = (E0, E2) occurs we conclude that
α) event E1 occurs at time t1, by reasoning with C1,
or
β) event F1 occurs at time t1, by reasoning with C2.
Since E1 ⊥ F1 means that E1 and F1 are mutually exclusive events, ac-
cording to Kent the simultaneous validity of (α) and (β) makes it “hard
to take it [CHA] seriously as a fundamental theory in its present form”
[4]. Even though single family rule 3 formally prevents contrary infer-
ences from yielding theoretical contradiction [8], “Any formalism [...] can
be made free from contradiction by such a restriction” [7].
The answer of Griffiths ([10], Appendix A) was that the problem arises
because Kent assigns to ‘contrary’ histories h1 and h2 the classical-logic
meaning of word contrary, i.e. that the occurrence of h1 always implies
8the non-occurrence of h2, as stated by axiom 3 in section 6 of present
paper. But, according to Griffiths, this cannot be done because h1 and
h2 cannot be compared without violating single family rule 3.
3.2. Ordered consistency
A proposal to solve the problem is due to Kent himself. He proposed to re-
place the original criterion of consistency, i.e. by a more restricitive one he
called ordered consistency [11]. Kent defined the ordering h1 ≤ h2 iff Ek ≤
Fk for all k, where h1 = (E1, E2, ..., Ek, ...) and h2 = (F1, F2, ..., Fk, ...).
History h1 is said to be ordered consistent if h1 belongs to a consistent
family and if h1 ≤ h2 implies Tr(Ch1ρC
∗
h1
) ≤ Tr(Ch2ρC
∗
h2
), for every h2
belonging to a consistent family. When all histories of a consistent family
C are ordered consistent, then C is said to be ordered consistent. Then
Kent proved that contrary inferences are forbidden if the new criterion of
consistency is adopted. However, it must be noticed that the sense of the
proposal of Kent was not to suggest that the ordered consistent formalism
is the “right” interpretation of quantum theory: “The aim here is thus
not to propose the ordered consistent approach as a plausible fundamental
interpretation of quantum theory, but to suggest that the range of nat-
ural and useful mathematical definitions of types of quantum history is
wider than previously understood.” [11]. In the present work a different
9approach to the problem of contrary inferences is followed; in section 6 we
show that contrary inferences do not yield contradiction if the conceptual
basis introduced in section 4 is adopted.
3.3. More general criticism
The more general criticism raised by Bassi and Ghirardi also gives a formal
content to that of Kent. They take into account four assumptions, labelled
as (a), (b), (c) and (d) in [1]. The first two, (a) and (b), essentially reflect
the content of our rule 1 and rule 2. The third assumption, (c), reflects
the meaning of the notion of occurrence of history as expressed by (O):
(c) The occurrence of a given history “cannot depend from the decoherent
[i.e. consistent] family one is considering.”
Bassi and Ghirardi proved that these assumptions lead to logical contra-
diction with the following fourth assumption.
(d) “Any decoherent family must be taken into account”, because “some
supporters [of CHA] insist in claiming that there are no priviledged
families.” [1].
In his reply [5][12] Griffiths uses essentially two arguments.
1. The derivation of the contradiction violates the single family rule.
2. “The conceptual difficulty goes away if one supposes that the two in-
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compatible frameworks are being used to describe two distinct phys-
ical systems that are described by the same initial data” [13].
All replies have not convinced [7][6] the critics of CHA. We shall
attempt to explain synthetically the reason for such a disagreement by
using example 1. Suppose that the known data about a single physical
system s are that E0 and E2 occur. In order to establish whether E1
occurs or not, a physicist can use family C1 and, in accordance with (1),
he finds that E1 occurs. But another physicist, for the same individual
system s, could choose C2, and he must conclude that F1 occurs. The
fact that E1 occurs or F1 occurs seems to depend on the physicist’s choice
of family C1 or C2. But, according to CHA itself, the occurrence of a
history, once established by means of the theory, is an objective fact. As
a consequence, both E1 and F1 should occur. But this final conclusion is
rejected by everybody because E1 ⊥ F1.
We see that replies 1 and 2 above do not provide a satisfactory answer
to the problem. Therefore, the question
what is the event which occurs for this s, E1 or F1?
remains open.
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4. Conceptual basis
To begin our analysis, we take into account basic principles (I) and (O).
Principle (I) entails that, given a consistent family C, each time the fact
that ‘an elementary history of C occurs and all other elementary histories
do not occur’ objectively takes place, this holds for one individual concrete
sample of the physical system. Then, for every family C we can postulate
the existence of a set c(C), whose elements represent all concrete physical
systems, such that for each individual s ∈ c(C) every history of C either
occurs or does not occur. In CHA language, an individual concrete system
s belongs to c(C) if and only if every history h ∈ C either occurs or does
not occur (makes sense) for this s. The introduction of set c(C), we shall
call support of C, allows us to formally express the consistency of a family
by means of a simple definition.
DEFINITION 1. A family C is consistent if and only if c(C) 6= ∅.
Now we shall establish, in a coherent fashion, basic principle (P), and
general Axioms 1 and 2. Let s be an individual physical system. If
s /∈ c(C), then a history of C does not necessarily make sense for s, even if
C is consistent. In this case to ask for the occurrence of a history h ∈ C is
generally speaking as meaningless, as, for instance, to ask for the political
12
tendency of an electron. Then, the following principle must hold:
(P) the (sufficient) condition which makes the conclusions of logical rea-
sonings based on a family C valid is
s ∈ c(C). (2)
Now we introduce the first formal axiom.
AXIOM 1. Let C1, C2 be two families of histories. Then
C1 ⊆ C2 implies c(C2) ⊆ c(C1).
Let us explain why Axiom 1 should hold. Since the validity of Axiom
1 is obvious when c(C2) = ∅, we consider the case in which c(C2) 6= ∅. If
s ∈ c(C2), then there is an elementary history h2 of C2 which occurs, and
all other elementary histories of C2 do not occur for this s. From C1 ⊆ C2
it follows that all elementary histories of C1 form a set, denoted by E1, of
albeit non-elementary histories of C2 (C1 is a coarser graining than C2).
Only one history h1 among those of E1 occurs in correspondence with this
s, because there is a unique h1 ∈ E1 such that h2 ∈ h1, and all other
h ∈ E1 do not occur (see (I)). Therefore, it is possible to state that only
one elementary history of C1 occurs and all the others do not occur for
this individual system s, thus s ∈ c(C1).
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Now we proceed to state axiom 2. If h ∈ C, by c1(h; C) (resp., c0(h; C))
we denote the subset of c(C) whose elements are the systems for which h
occurs (resp., does not occur). It is obvious that
c0(h; C) = c(C) \ c1(h; C) and c(C) = ∪h∈E c1(h; C). (3)
We adopt the notion of occurrence of history expressed by (O), according
to which the occurrence of h = (E1, E2, ..., En) is equivalent to the occur-
rences of all events E1, E2, ...En, without making reference to the family
which h belongs to. Coherently, we state the further following axiom.
AXIOM 2. If h ∈ C ∩ C′, then c1(h; C) ∩ c0(h; C
′) = c1(h; C
′) ∩ c0(h; C) = ∅.
In other words, h cannot both occur as history of C and do not occur as
history of C′, for the same system s.
Now we use axioms 1 and 2 to introduce the notion of truth func-
tional stemming from our approach. Let X be a set of histories. The
family generated by X is C(X) = ∩X⊆C C. For instance, family C({h})
generated by a single history h = (E1, E2, ..., En) is the family having
E(h) = {(F1, F2, ..., Fn) | Fk ∈ {Ek, E
′
k}} as set of elementary histories;
indeed, h ∈ C implies C({h}) ⊆ C.
Through Axiom 1 we find that h ∈ C implies c(C) ⊆ c(C({h})) =
∪h∈C c(C). Therefore, c(h) ≡ c(C({h})) is the set of all concrete physical
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systems for which single history h occurs or does not occur (h makes
sense). By c1(h) (resp., c0(h))we denote the subset of those systems for
which h occurs (resp., does not occur). Of course
c0(h) = c(h) \ c1(h), c1(h) = c(h) \ c0(h). (4)
Then for each physical system s, we can define the mapping
ts : ∪s∈c(C) C → {0, 1}, ts(h) =
{
1 if s ∈ c1(h)
0 if s ∈ c0(h),
(5)
called truth functional relative to s. If ts(h) = 1, then h occurs as history
of C({h}), and hence it occurs as history of whatever family C such that
h ∈ C and s ∈ c(C).
In order to perform our conceptual analysis of CHA, we have to con-
sider the formal tools just established, together with standard axioms of
CHA, which we here formulate as axioms CHA.1 and CHA.2.
AXIOM CHA.1. A family C is consistent if and only if it is weakly deco-
hering.
AXIOM CHA.2. Let C be a consistent family. If h ∈ C, then p(h) =
1
N
Tr(ChC
∗
h) is the probability of occurrence of history h.
The existence of (non-empty) set c(C) for every (consistent) family C is
a logical consequence of the notion (O) of occurrence of history. Whether
a given concrete sample s of the physical system belongs to c(C) or not is a
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question the physicist can try to answer by using the tools provided by the
theoretical apparatus, as the axioms, and the initial data at his disposal;
for instance, see our discussion of the problem of contrary inferences in
section 6. However, due to the intrinsically stochastic character of CHA
[13], a general characterization of c(C) cannot be given, though its exis-
tence cannot be denied without affecting th ojectivity of the occurrences
of histories, which is one of the peculiar basic ideas of CHA.
On the other hand, we encounter a similar situation in other valu-
able physical theories. For instance, classical statistical mechanics as-
sumes that many micro-states correspond to one macro-state, and that
the micro-state of an individual system (e.g. a gas) in a known macro-
state is unique at a particular time t. While such an assumption is very
useful in developing the theory, in general the theory itself is not able to
establish the particular micro-state the system occupies when its macro-
state is known.
5. Conceptual analysis
Now we shall demonstrate explicitly that our analysis leads to the con-
clusion that assumption (d) in section 3 does not hold. Assumption (c)
still holds, and we get a more precise understanding of it. In so doing, we
16
can also point out how the standard interpretation should be modified.
First, we consider assumption (c). Because of Axiom 2 and (5) it is
clear that we have to agree with the following idea expressed by Bassi
and Ghirardi: “Does the truth value of the considered history depend on
the decoherent family to which it may belong? We think that the answer
must be “no”. ” [6]. However, now we have a deeper understanding.
The fact that a given history h0 occurs (or does not occur) for a physical
system s0 entails that a family C0 exists such that
h0 ∈ C0 and s0 ∈ c(C0). (6)
For instance, in virtue of Axiom 1, family C0 = C({h0}) fullfils these re-
quirements. All histories of C0 make sense for s0. However, the eventuality
that for a given system s history h ∈ C occurs, where C is a consistent
family, but s /∈ c(C) is logically possible; remark 3 in section 6 provides
an explicit example. In general, therefore, the fact that a family C is con-
sistent, and h ∈ C does not imply that the inferences obtained by means
of reasonings based on C hold for an arbitrary physical system s for which
h occurs.
Furthermore, assumption (c) cannot be generally interpreted in the
sense that truth functional ts must be defined on all consistent families.
Indeed, set Ds which ts is defined on, is just Ds = ∪s∈c(C)C. Therefore, we
17
also agree with Griffiths’ conclusion [12] stating that in quantum physics
there is no universal truth functional.
Now we come to assumption (d). Once again, principle (P) denies
that all consistent families are valid bases for quantum reasonings. Only
if a family C satisfies (2), can the inferences based on C be considered
valid. However, the failure of assumption (d) does not yield conceptual
difficulties, because whether a family can be used or not depends on con-
dition (2), rather than on the physisist’s (subjective) choice. Eventhough
a general criterion for establishing whether (2)holds is not available, un-
der certain circumstances we can state that (2) certainly holds. For in-
stance, suppose that the following statement holds for s: “history h0
occurs” (initial data). Then s ∈ c1(h0), and hence s ∈ c(C({h0})), are
true statements. Thus, all sentences obtained by logical deductions based
on C({h0}) hold for s.
Family C({h0}) admits several refinements, i.e. various families C may
exist such that C({h0}) ⊆ C. Deductions based on a refinement C in gen-
eral do not hold for s ∈ c(C({h0})); indeed, as already argued, C({h0}) ⊆ C
implies, by Axiom 1, c(C) ⊆ c(C({h0})), and therefore s ∈ c(C) does not
necessarily follow. Of course, all inferences obtained by reasoning with
C({h0}) can be obtained with C, since C({h0}) ⊆ C, therefore the two set
18
of sentences cannot contradict each other, but inferences involving histo-
ries in C \ C({h0}) in general do not make sense if s ∈ c(C({h0})) \ c(C).
The whole argument immediately extends to the more general case in
which the data consist in the occurrence of a given set X of histories, by
replacing C({h}) with C(X).
Thus, there is a profound difference between the “coarsest” family
C(X) compatible with the available initial data relative to a physical
system s and any refinement C of C(X): conclusions drawn by using C(X)
are true, i.e. objective facts, whereas the truth of conclusions obtained
from a refinement is not ensured by the truth of the data (X) alone. For
instance, if a reasoning made in C(X) leads us to infer that a certain
history h1 ∈ C(X) occurs, such an occurrence must be considered an
objective fact. On the contrary, when the occurrence of a history h2 ∈
C \ C(X) is inferred by a reasoning made in C, such an occurrence cannot
be considered certain.
REMARK 1. Griffiths puts forward a precise strategy for choosing the fam-
ily to be used: “Use the smallest, or coarsest framework which contains
both the initial data and the additional properties of interest in order to
analyse the problem.” [13]. In the present approach Griffiths’ strategy is
not always valid. Indeed, coarsest family C containing, besides the initial
19
data, the properties of interest as well, does not satisfy (2) in general.
Thus, a conclusion of our analysis is that assumption (d) cannot be
mantained, while assumption (c) holds.
REMARK 2. Kent considered single family rule 3 an unnatural expedient
to avoid contradiction [7] and this was at root of the criticisms; we see
that that it is sufficient our quite natural principle (P) to avoid conflicts
between conclusions drawn from different families. However, since in
Griffiths’ theory the conclusions drawn in different families hold together
in the case that these families are ‘compatible’, we recall the definition of
compatibilty.
DEFINITION 2. Two consistent families C1 and C2 are compatible if a
third consistent family C exists such that C1 ∪ C2 ⊆ C.
Compatibility implies c(C) ⊆ c(C1) ∩ c(C2); therefore, according to our
approach, the conclusions drawn from C1 and C2 hold together only for
those systems s such that s ∈ c(C1) ∩ c(C2), in particular if s ∈ c(C); on
the contrary, if s ∈ c(C1) and s /∈ c(C2), then a conclusion drawn from C2
does not necessarily hold for this s (see remark 3 in the next section for
a concrete example).
20
6. Re-interpreting contrary inferences
It is worthwhile seeing whether the particular situation of contrary infer-
ences, described in example 1, can be interpreted without encountering
conceptual difficulties.
Let E and F be two mutually orthogonal projections. The family gener-
ated by E and F , i.e. C({E, F}), has 3 elementary (one-event) histories:
E = {E, F,G = 1− (E + F )}; it is the smallest family containing E and
F . Then, whenever both E and F make sense, all histories in C({E, F})
must make sense too. Therefore, we can state the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. If E ⊥ F , then s ∈ c(E) ∩ c(F ) implies s ∈ c(C({E, F}))
and, therefore, c1(E) ∩ c1(F ) = ∅.
Proposition 1 says that two perpendicular projections represent mutually
exclusive events.
Kent’s example 1 would be a proof of a contradiction if C1 and C2 were
compatible families. Indeed, if C1 and C2 were compatible, there would be
a consistent family C such that C1 ∪ C2 ⊆ C. Then, from axiom 1
c(C) ⊆ c(C1) ∩ c(C2) (7)
would follow; furthermore h0 = (E0, E2) ∈ C. By p(E0, E2) 6= 0 in (1)
21
we find that there exists sˆ ∈ c1(h0) ∩ c(C). By (7), sˆ ∈ c(C1) ∩ c(C2).
Therefore, by (1) we should conclude sˆ ∈ c1(E1) and sˆ ∈ c1(F1). Thus we
have a contradiction with c1(E1) ∩ c1(F1) = ∅ following from proposition
1, since E1 ⊥ F1.
However, C1 and C2 in example 1 are not compatible families, therefore
this argument does not apply. On the contrary, the occurrence of history
h0 = (E0, E2) does not give rise to conceptual difficulties. The condition
to be satisfied to avoid the contradiction is
c1(h0) ∩ c(C1) ∩ c(C2) = ∅. (8)
Indeed, if s ∈ c1(h0) ∩ c(C1) ∩ c(C2) 6= ∅, then s ∈ c1(E1) ∩ c1(F1) 6= ∅
would follow from (1), in contradiction with Prop.1.
If C1 and C2 are not compatible, (8) is logically consistent with the
occurrence of h0. Indeed, from
h0 ∈ C1 ∩ C2, (9)
by axiom 1 we get
c(C1) ∪ c(C2) ⊆ c(h0),
which is consistent with (8). In particular, when h0 occurs, i.e. s ∈
c1(h0) ⊆ c(h0), we have 3 distinct possibilities, all consistent with (8);
namely
22
p) s ∈ c(C1), and then E1 occurs. In such a case consistency with (8)
requires that s /∈ c(C2), therefore the second equation in (1), stating
that ‘h0 occurs implies F1 occurs’, does not hold for this s. There are
two possibilities regarding the occurrence of F1:
p1) s ∈ c(F1) \ c(C2). This possibility is consistent because F1 ∈
C2 implies c(C2) ⊆ c(F1). By axioms 2 and proposition 1 we must
conclude that F1 does not occur, i.e. s ∈ c0(F1);
p2) s /∈ c(F1), therefore F1 does not make sense, i.e. it neither occurs
nor does not occur.
q) s ∈ c(C2), and then F1 occurs. In such a case we have for E1 the same
conclusions of item (a) for F1.
r) s /∈ c(C1) ∪ c(C2). In this case no inference about E1 or F1 can be
drawn from the data and (1).
Which of the alternative, and mutually exclusive, possibilities (p), (q)
and (r) above is actually realized with our initial data (s ∈ c1(h0)) is a
question which cannot be answered without further data.
REMARK 3. The foregoing argument provides a concrete example in which
a statement drawn from a consistent family (C({h0})) holds, whereas
another statement drawn from another family compatible with C({h0})
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does not hold. Indeed, statement “h0 occurs” must hold for some s ∈
c(C({h0})), because p(h0) 6= 0, whereas at least one of the statements “E1
occurs” or “F1 occurs”, drawn in correspondence with initial datum “h0
occurs” from C1 or C2, must not hold, where both C1 and C2 are compatible
with c(C({h0})).
REMARK 4. In [13] Griffiths presents another argument for showing the
absence of any contradiction in CHA. In discussing the 3-boxes paradox,
quite equivalent to contrary inferences, he shows that the contradiction
arises when Axiom 3 below is assumed to hold.
AXIOM 3. If E ⊥ F , then
i) s ∈ c(E) ∩ c(F ) implies s ∈ c(C({E, F})),
ii) c1(E) ⊆ c0(F ).
This axiom relies more on implications drawn from perpendicularity, than
proposition 1. Griffiths argues that the validity of this axiom is misleading
in CHA, and therefore the contradiction disappears once Axiom 3 is ruled
out. Our consistent interpretation of contrary inferences actually does
not make use of Axiom 3. This may therefore give rise to the suspicion
that our solution of contrary inferences works only because we have not
assumed Axiom 3. On the contrary, our argument above can be repeated
24
along the same lines with Axiom 3 instead of proposition 1. The results
turn out to be the same, with the only difference that possibility (p2) in
item (p) can no longer occur.
25
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